The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN Security Council. But the questions for the Inquiry were: whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003; and whether the UK could - and should - have been better prepared for what followed. The Inquiry concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort. They also concluded that the judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate. Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point but in March 2003 there was no imminent threat and the majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring. The Inquiry identified what lessons should be learned from experience in Iraq, including: the management of relations with allies, especially the US; the importance of collective Ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge; the need to assess risks, weigh options and set an achievable and realistic strategy; the vital role of Ministerial leadership and co-ordination of action across Government, supported by senior officials; and the need to ensure that both the civilian and military arms of Government are properly equipped for their tasks